

April 16, 1932.

MEMORANDUM:

Subject: Point 7, American Proposals.

1. The table herewith is an illustration of the application of the principles underlying Point 7 of the American proposals. The fundamental conception is based upon the realization of the fact that each government is under the obligation to maintain law and order within its own boundaries, and at the same time to provide for the protection of its nationals and its territories from external aggression. The means generally accepted for the performance of these duties are found in the organization and employment of police forces, constabularies, and armed forces organized on a military basis; and in the majority of cases the armed forces of the nation, military, naval, and air, constitute the last and most important means of executing these essential functions of national sovereignty. Under the theory of this proposal, these armed forces are considered under two heads:

(1) The Police Component, which is maintained primarily with the idea of insuring internal order and patrolling the frontiers; and

(2) The Defense Component, maintained primarily with the idea of insuring protection from external aggression.

It is obvious that the former, the size of which is determined by many factors, economic, social, geographical, and religious, all relatively stable in regard to any particular country, is not capable of reduction; while the latter, determined primarily by the size of the forces of neighboring nations, which might take aggressive action against them, may be capable of reduction without disturbing the relative military strengths of the nations concerned.

The figures on which this table is based, and appearing in columns 2 to 7 inclusive, are taken from the special edition (1932) of the "Armaments Year Book", except where otherwise covered in the notes appended to the table. The totals in columns 5 to 8 inclusive include "formations organized on a military basis" falling within the terms of the Draft Convention, as reported by the nation concerned.

2. The rates which form the basis of the computations appearing in columns 9 and 10 were determined as follows:

(a) The metropolitan police component rate appearing under the heading "Home Forces" in column 9 was determined by taking the total population of four powers - Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Germany - 86,700,000, and the total armed forces maintained in 1930 under the provisions of the peace treaties applying to those countries - 201,046, which gives the rate of 2.32 per thousand of population.

(b) The overseas police component rate appearing under the heading of "Overseas Forces" in column 10, was determined by taking the total population of overseas territories, including mandates, of eight (8) colonial powers, - Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States - 221,213,000, and the total armed forces maintained for duty in such territories by these eight powers, 584,359, which gives the rate of 2.64 per thousand of population in the overseas territories.

3. The application of these rates to the countries of the world is shown in columns 9 and 10, with a total of the police component in column 11.

Column 12 represents the difference between the police component and the forces actually maintained (1930) as shown in column 8, and these forces under this theory are those maintained for defense against external aggression.

Column 13 represents the amount for each country, of the reductions in average daily effectives providing the defense component appearing in column 12 were cut 25% for each country which possesses such a component. The resultant reduction in the armed forces of the world, providing such action were taken, would be 944,438 men, as indicated in the total appearing at the foot of column 13.

Column 14 represents the size of the defense component of countries which maintain the same, after the reductions indicated in column 13 are made. In this connection it should be noted that the relative armed strength of the countries which maintain a defense component is not materially changed.

4. The advantages of the scheme indicated in the table herewith are as follows:

(a) The rates are based on averages which presumably represent a fair composite of varying conditions.

The metropolitan rate presumably will give the requirements for local European conditions, as it represents the average in regard to conditions and requirements of the powers limited by the Peace Treaties.

The colonial rate represents the composite of conditions met by eight colonial powers in their territories throughout the world.

The rates in question, being based on averages, are not open to attack on account of singling out one power and taking account only of the special conditions applicable to that power.

(b) The application of these rates, based on the status quo, generally does not disturb the relative positions of the powers of the world.

(c) The application of this scheme would result in the savings attendant upon the reduction of almost 1,000,000 men from the present armaments of the world.

(d) The application of this scheme would automatically remove from the consideration of this Conference the troublesome questions of Trained Reserves, of the relative merits or demerits of professional armies and conscriptive forces, and would reduce the probability of long discussion on the revision of the Peace Treaties.

(e) The scheme represents a fair, just and reasonable first step both for limitation and reduction of armaments.

(f) This scheme is a first step for carrying into effect the provision of the Peace Treaties to the effect that the limitations placed on the defeated Central Powers was the first step towards the general reduction of armaments, and, in consequence, executes to a degree the provisions of Article 8 of the Pact.

(g) This scheme while not materially disturbing the status quo, allows each nation, within the numbers designated, full freedom of action as to organization and equipment of its forces to meet its own particular problems.

(h) It makes possible concrete results in the form of a reduction readily understood by the mass of the people in each country.

5. The disadvantages of the scheme are as follows:

(a) The application of the ratios represents an increase of about 27,000 in the police component of Germany and a reduction of approximately 35,000 for the other Central Powers. This objection as far as Germany is concerned may be met, if desirable, by an escalator clause, or by a provision against increases beyond present strength.

(b) The French may object to a reduction of 130,000 men with no corresponding reduction on the part of Germany. This can be met by the statement that the application of biological laws makes France face a similar reduction in her classes beginning with 1935. As she must then reduce on account of lack of man power, the reduction provided herein might be gracefully accepted.

(c) This scheme, based upon the total of land, sea, and air armaments, may be objected to on the ground that the inclusion of naval forces involves indirectly the London and Washington Treaties. As most nations are primarily concerned only with land and air armaments, it might be wiser to limit the application of this scheme to land and air forces and have naval forces covered by an extension of existing naval treaties, although in this event the total of reductions would be less.

(d) This method of reduction by application of a formula, is not entirely sound, as it does not take into consideration all of the factors on which the power of national defense is determined - it considers only one of those factors, namely, population.

6. It is needless to point out that the acceptance of this scheme by the Conference is dependent to a large degree upon careful preparation and the exercise of sound Conference strategy. The scheme undoubtedly would have the greatest chance of success were it submitted by the French as their own proposition. If, for political reasons, it is considered inadvisable to ask the French to present the scheme, then it appears to be essential to sell it to the representatives of France, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, and possibly Japan, before the proposition is presented to the Conference. It is suggested that such conversations should be held only between the chief delegates concerned.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Lieut. Colonel, U. S. Army.